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Abstract
Disaster governance in conflict areas is of growing academic concern, but most existing research comprises either single
case studies or studies of a variety of country contexts that group all types of conflict together. Based on three case stud-
ies, this article offers a middle-ground scenario-based approach, focusing on disaster governance in authoritarian contexts
experiencing low-intensity conflict. Low-intensity conflict is characterized by intense political tensions and violence that
is more readily expressed in ways other than direct physical harm. Inspired by Olson’s (2000) maxim that disasters are
intrinsically political, this article explores the politics of disaster response by asking what is at stake and what happened,
unpacking these questions for state, civil society, and international humanitarian actors. Using data from a total of one year
of qualitative fieldwork, the article analyzes disaster governance in 2016 drought-ridden Ethiopia, marked by protests and
a State of Emergency; 2015 floodedMyanmar, characterized by explosive identity politics; and 2016–2019 drought-ridden
Zimbabwe, with its intense socioeconomic and political turbulence. The study’s findings show how framing and power
processes in disaster governance—comprising state and non-state actors—largely lean toward the state, with the conse-
quence that political interests, rather than needs assessments, steer who and what will be protected from disaster impact.
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1. Introduction
In 2000, Olson asked, “Why has it been so difficult to gain
sustained, systematic attention to the political aspects
of disasters?” (2000, p. 265). The question is still being
asked today, with a particularly strong call to studymicro-
political dynamics in situations where disaster and con-
flict overlap (Peters, Holloway, & Peters, 2019; Siddiqi,
2018). Disaster governance—the interplay of different
actors reducing and/or responding to disaster risks—is
beset by politics. This is especially the case in conflict-
affected areas, where the response parameters differ
vastly from the disaster response mechanisms specified
in, for example, the Sendai Framework for Action (United
Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction,
2015). Moreover, the existing disaster–conflict literature
rarely recognizes the diversity of conflict situations. This
article therefore focuses on one type of conflict—low-
intensity conflict (LIC) in authoritarian settings.
Despite constituting the largest share of con-
flicts worldwide, LICs are generally under-researched
(Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research,
2019). In LIC settings, violence is more readily expressed
in ways other than direct physical harm. Largely unpre-
dictable riots, violent clashes, targeted attacks, and
repression are indeed part of the conflict, but scholars
Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 4, Pages 343–354 343
foreground accusatory rhetoric, discriminatory policies,
and other forms of structural and cultural violence,
which fuel tensions within and across state and soci-
etal groups (Azar, 1990; Demmers, 2012; Galtung, 1996).
LICs are generally associated with a threshold of few-
er than 1,000 casualties and are not unique to author-
itarian settings (Human Security Report Project, 2016).
Authoritarian practices also differ from illiberal practices
(i.e., human rights infringements) in that they specifically
pose a threat to democratic processes. Through author-
itarian practices, accountability between people and
their political representatives is sabotaged “by means
of secrecy, disinformation and disabling voice” (Glasius,
2018, p. 517). However, authoritarian and illiberal prac-
tices often go hand in hand, especially in protracted con-
flict situations with cycles of contestation and repression
(Azar, 1990).
In authoritarian LICs, an important disaster response
parameter is the complex nature of the state, which
tends to be functioning but repressive. Understanding
of humanitarian–state interactions in settings where the
state constitutes a “hazard” for precarious communities
remains limited (Carrigan, 2015, p. 121). This lack of
understanding is particularly problematic because cur-
rent international and (most) national disaster policy
identifies the state as the primary disaster response
actor and interlocutor for civil society and international
humanitarian actors (Harvey, 2013).
There are two dominant strands in existing conflict–
disaster research. The first is single case studies, where
the description of specific path dependencies and pro-
cesses limit the theoretical understanding of broad-
er institutional processes at play (e.g., de Billon &
Waizenegger, 2007; Venugopal & Yasir, 2017). The oth-
er strand grounds its claims in large-N studies group-
ing together dozens of ‘conflict’ country cases (e.g.,
Drury & Olson, 1998; Nel & Righarts, 2008). Research
in this second strand has focused on establishing macro-
level causal linkages between disasters, conflict, and
peace, without seeking in-depth understanding of the
processes through which conflict affects societies’ ability
to respond to disasters, weakens institutional response
capacity, and hampers the provision of aid (Wisner, 2012).
This article takes an intermediate approach between the
two existing research strands, discussing three authori-
tarian LIC cases. This work is part of a series of small-N
studies, which also draws out disaster–conflict dynam-
ics in high-intensity and post-conflict scenarios (Hilhorst,
van Voorst, Mena, Desportes, & Melis, 2019). We rely on
scenario-building to describe core political processes that
are ideal-typical of a particular type of conflict.
The present article draws on one year of qual-
itative fieldwork in Ethiopia (focusing on the 2016
drought overlapping with protests and a State of
Emergency), Myanmar (focusing on the 2015 Cyclone
Komen response and explosive identity politics), and
Zimbabwe (focusing on the 2016–2019 drought coin-
ciding with intense socioeconomic and political turbu-
lences). A first phase of analysis described the unique-
ness of the individual cases in three separate publi-
cations on Ethiopia (Desportes, Mandefro, & Hilhorst,
2019), Myanmar (Desportes, 2019), and Zimbabwe
(Desportes, 2020). This article presents the results of
the second phase of analysis, where the different con-
texts were brought “together and into the same ana-
lytical frame,” allowing us to “think with insights from
elsewhere” (Robinson, 2016, p. 193–194). At this stage,
we aimed to bring all three cases into conversation with
each other (Jacobs, 2012), seeking contrasts and similar-
ities between them to advance the conceptualization of
disaster–conflict dynamics in authoritarian LIC areas.
2. Disaster Politics in Authoritarian Low-Intensity
Conflict Settings
The largely technocratic nature of disaster studies has
been challenged since the 1980s, with the introduction
of the ‘vulnerability paradigm’ (Blaikie, Cannon, Davis,
& Wisner, 1994; Hewitt, 1983; O’Keefe, Westgate, &
Wisner, 1976; Wisner, Blaikie, Cannon, & Davis., 2003).
This school of thought highlighted howpolitical, econom-
ic, and social processes produce vulnerabilities that turn
hazardous events into disasters. Although this body of
work certainly recognized the importance of political pro-
cesses in the creation of disaster risks, Olson’s (2000)
article “Toward a Politics of Disaster: Losses, Values,
Agendas and Blame” was seminal in setting a research
agenda for how politics works during and in the after-
math of disaster. Olson called for scholars to approach
disasters as explicitly political processes, highlighting
how, in addition to being managed through authorities
taking certain actions instead of others and allocating
resources (and thus values) in specific ways, disasters
must also be explained. Olson put forward three ques-
tions which are commonly debated by political represen-
tatives and societal actors, thus turning disasters into
“agenda control and accountability crises” (Olson, 2000,
pp. 266, 273):
1. What happened? (This entails defining the mean-
ing of the event and inscribing it within causal sto-
ries about why the disaster happened and what its
consequences are).
2. Whywere the losses (so) high and/or the response
(so) inadequate? (This is what Olson refers to as
the ‘blame game’ of assigning responsibility).
3. What will happen now? (This question is about
determining how resources are allocated for recov-
ery and reconstruction efforts).
We take inspiration from Olson’s questions, modifying
them to reflect current notions about disaster gover-
nance. We also adapt them to our study’s focus, i.e.,
select the questions which can best draw out the polit-
ical dynamics that are key to disaster response in author-
itarian LIC settings.
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Our focus on disaster response specifically, excluding
recovery and reconstruction, positions question three
outside the scope of our study. Moreover, although
Olson was mainly interested in the role of “authorities,
governments and entire regimes” (Olson, 2000, p. 283),
more recent disaster governance literature highlights
howdisaster response results from interactions between
the state, civil society, humanitarians, and a variety of
other actors. These interactions take place in a human-
itarian arena in which multi-level power relations play
a major role (Hilhorst & Jansen, 2010). The question of
‘what happened’ should therefore be unpacked for dif-
ferent groups of actors who bring their own frames and
interests to the table to shape the disaster response pro-
cess and who draw on different sources of power to
advance their views and interests.
Paying attention to the interplay between differ-
ent actors is especially important because power is
inherently relational and performative (Giddens, 1984,
pp. 257–258). Authoritarian LIC scenarios are marked by
significant power imbalances that emerge through inter-
actions between state and non-state actors: The state
holds ‘naturalized authority’ and coercive power to allo-
cate resources and restrict non-state actors (del Valle &
Healy, 2013; Desportes et al., 2019, p. 36). Some interna-
tional actors such as donor agencies rely on ‘soft’ (finan-
cial) power to influence the humanitarian space, they
can thus also act as authorities allocating resources and
values. But international actors are often perceived as
external actors interfering with or even threatening the
internal domestic order (Cunningham, 2018, p. 31). It is
crucial to distinguish between state and non-state actors
when analyzing disaster response, but it is also impor-
tant to take into account that some non-state actors do
have power and can act as ‘authorities.’ This actor differ-
entiation is reflected in our analysis and in the questions
explored in this article.
We also refine Olson’s attention to politics by bring-
ing ‘everyday politics’ more explicitly into the picture.
Everyday politics determine the control, allocation, pro-
duction, and use of resources, as well as the values and
ideas underlying activities. Everyday politics play a key
role in shaping disaster response interactions in prac-
tice (Hilhorst, 2013). In relation to disasters, being cog-
nizant of everyday politics implies scrutinizing the ‘nor-
mal’ acts of disaster response: “The selection of risks to
be addressed, the allocation of burdens generated by
particular risks, the intentions and interactions of differ-
ent actors and the choices to apply certain techniques
over others” (Hilhorst, 2013, p. 2). Olson’s questions
mostly refer to ‘big political framings,’ political stakes,
values, and accusations. Generating more detailed ques-
tions helps in capturing disaster responders’ socially
embedded everyday interactions.
In this article, we thus examine the following three
questions. The first, what is at stake? Disaster response
evolves aroundmore than alleviating suffering. Disasters
“open political space for the contestation or concentra-
tion of political power and the underlying distributions
of rights between citizens and citizens and the state”
(Pelling & Dill, 2010, p. 15). Emphasizing the ‘disaster as
lens’ over the ‘disaster as catalyst’ approach, some schol-
ars have stressed that disasters reveal rather than dis-
rupt social struggles and inherent inequities (Cuny, 1983),
relationships between actors (Pelling & Dill, 2006), and
political narratives (Venugopal & Yasir, 2017). This is par-
ticularly true in LIC settings, where political power and
the distribution of rights are already contested before
the disaster and where emotions and accusations often
override facts that are difficult to assess (Desportes et al.,
2019; Hutchison, 2014). Referring again to Olson (2000),
disaster responders may gain or lose in legitimacy and
power because of their actions but also because of how
their actions and motivations are framed or ‘explained.’
Second, what will happen now from the authori-
ties’ side? Literature on LIC and authoritarian dynam-
ics directs our attention to the structural and cultural
means through which power and violence are expressed
(Galtung, 1996). Everyday politics are central in that legal
instruments, bureaucracy, and daily engagements with
government officials or community leaders restrict or
influence aid access, activities, and beneficiary selection
(Desportes, 2019; Hilhorst, 2013). Authoritarian modes
of control involve establishing restrictions but also instill-
ing a culture of uncertainty and fear (Glasius et al., 2018).
The third and final question concerns what will hap-
pen now from the non-authorities’ side. For non-state
actors facing restrictions in authoritarian LIC settings,
outspoken confrontation is rarely the preferred option
(Cunningham, 2018). A more common strategy is social-
ly navigating around challenges—adjusting and interact-
ing with a constantly moving social environment, with
specific tactics depending on the situation (Vigh, 2009).
In what has been termed the ‘governance of percep-
tions,’ disaster responders operating in authoritarian LIC
settings seek to balance the expectations of various
groups (Desportes, 2019, p. 13), including by present-
ing themselves as respecting state sovereignty while still
being seen as fair by aid recipient communities.
3. Three Similar Disaster–Conflict Country Cases
In 2016 in Ethiopia, in 2015 in Myanmar, and in
2016–2019 in Zimbabwe, a disaster unfolded against
the backdrop of ongoing authoritarian practices and LIC
rooted in deep-seated dissatisfaction with the regime
in power (see Markakis, 2011, on Ethiopia; Matelski,
2016, on Myanmar; and McGregor, 2013, on Zimbabwe).
In all three countries, protests met with violence and
repression occurred or were reignited following a specif-
ic trigger.
The trigger in Ethiopia in 2016 was the feder-
al government’s intention to implement an integrated
urban master plan of Addis Ababa that encroached on
the surrounding Oromia Zone. Hundreds were killed
during clashes between protestors and state security
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forces. The government of Ethiopia declared a State of
Emergency in October 2016 and imprisoned thousands
of people without proper trial (Abbink, 2016). This socio-
political crisis overlapped with the worst drought in half
a century. Among the regions impacted by the drought
were Amhara and Oromia—the regions most affected by
the protests. The drought, which was triggered by the
El Niño climatic phenomenon, left 10,1 million people in
need of humanitarian assistance (United Nations, 2017).
In 2015 in Myanmar, violent rhetoric and clashes tar-
geted ethnic and religiousminorities, especiallyMuslims,
including the Rohingya ethnic group. These built on the
deadly inter-communal violence in Rakhine in 2012 and
the passing of the discriminatory Race and Religion laws
in 2015, which limit religious freedom and are discrim-
inatory in terms of religion and gender (Farzana, 2015).
Simultaneously, in 2015, Myanmar had to cope with
floods and landslides triggered by an unusually heavy
monsoon season and further compounded by Cyclone
Komen. The cyclone made landfall on July 30, 2015,
leading the government of Myanmar to list the Chin
and Rakhine ethnic states among the ‘natural disas-
ter zones’ on July 31, 2015 (National Natural Disaster
Management Committee, 2015). In total, 125 people
died, and more than 1,5 million were temporarily dis-
placed (United Nations Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs, 2015).
In Zimbabwe, increasing political rivalries and socioe-
conomic decline led to protests in 2016 (triggered by
the cash crisis and corruption scandals), 2018 (triggered
by the contested national election results), and 2019
(triggered by the tripling of fuel prices). Particularly
intense state repressionwas seen in 2018–2019,with the
killing of dozens of people, arbitrary beatings, group pun-
ishments, and extrajudicial imprisonment (Beardsworth,
Cheeseman, & Tinhu, 2019). The 2016 El Niño phe-
nomenon also impacted Zimbabwe, leading to the worst
drought in 25 years, which left more than five million
food insecure (United Nations Resident Coordinator in
Zimbabwe, 2016). A state of disaster was declared on
February 3, 2016, and international support was request-
ed in 2016 (United Nations, 2016) and in November
2018 following the return of unusually dry conditions
(ReliefWeb, 2018).
Ethnic politics played a role in all three cases, with
minority group members, and some international aid
actors, pointing towards Tigray/Bamar/Shona domina-
tion. However, it is important not to overemphasize iden-
tity and neglect socioeconomic differences (Taylor, 1982).
In Myanmar’s Rakhine State, and in both Ethiopia and
Zimbabwe, tensions along ethnic and religious lines inter-
meshwith the broader political economyof each context,
which may, for instance, cover up (corporate) scrambles
for land and resources.
In all three cases, the disaster response necessi-
tated the interplay of state, civil society organization
(CSO), and international humanitarian actors in sectors
such as nutrition, housing, water, sanitation, and health.
The three cases varied widely in terms of the type
of disaster (slow vs. quick onset) and multiple aspects
of country context, but this is not necessarily a draw-
back: Particularly strong theoretical contributions can be
made when “common causes or social processes can
be found in spite of these contrasts” (Höglund & Öberg,
2011, p. 117).
4. Methods
This article draws on one year of qualitative field-
work conducted from February to July 2017 in Ethiopia,
September 2016 to February 2017 in Myanmar, and
October 2018 to May 2019 in Zimbabwe. Table 1
presents characteristics of the cases and research partic-
ipants, which were selected to maximize diversity.
The small-N case study approach combines advan-
tages of a cross-case study (analytical breadth and com-
parison across different contexts) with those of a sin-
gle case study (in-depth contextual understanding of the
examined conflict and disaster processes). The small-N
case study approach aims to reach an “orderly, cumula-
tive development of knowledge and theory” (George &
Bennett, 2005, p. 70). Drawing inspiration from the struc-
tured focused comparison approach (George & Bennett,
2005, p. 67), we combined the rigor of (i) a common set
of questions to identify contrasts and similarities across
the case findings with (ii) sufficient flexibility to allow for
country contextualization and increasingly focused coun-
try case designs on the basis of findings from the previ-
ous cases.
Data collection was largely standardized across the
three cases, covering the same topics of disaster gover-
nance and response practices through semi-structured
interviews, informal exchanges, observation, and partici-
patorymethods, followingMoser and Stein (2010), when
circumstances allowed. The key challenges to disaster
response in authoritarian LIC contexts and the social
navigation and other strategies developed by non-state
actors to overcome these challenges were common to
all three cases. However, the weight allocated to dif-
ferent issues evolved across the cases, thus analytically
constructing the cases (Ragin, 1992) at different stages
of the research and across the three cases. Specifically,
these developments influenced the selection of coun-
tries and the increasingly detailed questions asked to
better understand processes identified as key in earli-
er case studies. For example, the fieldwork in Myanmar
and Zimbabwe, which was conducted after the fieldwork
in Ethiopia, largely moved away from state perspectives
to focus on non-state disaster responders’ social naviga-
tion strategies.
The data were thematically analyzed in two phas-
es, following Braun and Clarke (2006). First, context-
specificities, historical pathways, and nuances were
drawnout for each case (seeDesportes, 2019; Desportes,
2020; Desportes et al., 2019). Second, contrasts and
similarities were sought across cases (e.g., by revisit-
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Table 1. Three cumulative country cases.
Case Scale of focus Numbers of research participants
Ethiopia National, with visits to LIC disaster areas in the 38 community members
Amhara, Oromia, and Somali regions 22 state officials
14 CSO representatives
46 international humanitarians
2 researchers
Myanmar Regional, with a focus on the two ethnic 10 community members
minority states of Chin and Rakhine 1 state official
11 CSO representatives
21 international humanitarians
4 researchers
Zimbabwe Community, with a focus on one peri-urban 78 community members
community, Bulawayo 13 CSO representatives
16 international humanitarians
2 researchers
Notes: Participant numbers refer to individual in-depth interviews, except for the counts of community members, who sometimes par-
ticipated in focus groups. In the text, statements drawn from the interviews or focus group discussions are presented with information
on the type of actor and date in a way that preserves all participants’ confidentiality.
ing earlier cases, considering findings from later cases).
This approach turns the ‘comparative gesture’ on its
head, seeking commonalities in processes and outcomes
rather than aiming to identify differences (Robinson,
2016). Seeking commonalities across diverse contexts is
in line with the scenario-building exercise, which is large-
ly conceptual and thus is “concerned as much with creat-
ing usable ‘mental models’ as it is with reflecting reality”
(Wood & Flinders, 2014, p. 153). Glossing over complex-
ity and diversity to some extent and imaginatively work-
ing with ideal-typical scenarios helps to guide theoretical
exploration along the core disaster response dynamics
that emerge across comparable cases.
The similar authoritarian and LIC dynamics unfold-
ing in the three cases examined here also resulted
in common methodological challenges. These included
trust-building and gaining access to sensitive information
(e.g., reliable data on drought-induced health impacts
in Ethiopia), certain areas (e.g., the Rakhine State in
Myanmar), and actors (e.g., state actors in Zimbabwe).
Risks to the research partners and participants, as well as
associated ethical dilemmas, were also points of concern
(Glasius et al., 2018; Matelski, 2014). The challenges pre-
sented by these LIC and authoritarian settings were not
dissimilar to those faced by humanitarian workers: nego-
tiating access; building trust; dealing with contradicto-
ry information and advice; navigating bureaucracy, daily
encounters, and conversation topics; and selectively self-
censoring. These challenges certainly limited our inquiry
and understanding, especially of the most politically sen-
sitive issues. Nevertheless, the contradictions, rumors,
and silences surrounding these issues also provided use-
ful ‘meta-data’ that were considered when interpreting
our findings (Fujii, 2010).
5. Findings
5.1. What Is at Stake?
The answers to the question of what is at stake may
appear obvious: The state uses disaster to gain control
and legitimacy, whereas some non-state actors have the
opposite aim. In the interviews, it was striking that most
state and powerful international aid actors framed dis-
aster response as a wholly technical and apolitical pro-
cess. In stark contrast,mutual suspicions and accusations
were part of the overwhelmingmajority of the interviews
with other types of actors.
Regarding their views of the role of the state, the
participants generally agreed on the state’s capacity
to deal with the disaster (high in Ethiopia, low in
Myanmar, mixed accounts in Zimbabwe), but they doubt-
ed the goodwill of the state. For instance, an estab-
lished Zimbabwean consultant (#1, November 29, 2018)
asserted that the state did not want to see “food short-
ages framed as resulting from mismanagement” and
aimed to showcase itself internationally as a “function-
ing and responsible” entity. This also applied in devel-
opmental state-minded Ethiopia and in Myanmar, which
was in the midst of a ‘democratic transition’ in 2015.
In Myanmar, an international organization (IO) represen-
tative (#3, November 7, 2018) said that the message
the government wished to communicate to its domes-
tic audiences was that the government mostly takes care
of the majority Bamar ethnic group but not of Muslim
minorities, who were portrayed as an ‘internal threat’
to Myanmar.
In all three countries, the state was perceived as
using the disaster to advance its political goals—to end
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the protests in Ethiopia, to marginalize ethnic and reli-
giousminorities inMyanmar, and to assert the dominant
party’s power in Zimbabwe. This was reportedly accom-
plished by discriminating against already marginalized
political/ethnic/religious groups in aid distributions, but
also through direct violence such as the forced reloca-
tion of communities in military vehicles (as observed in
Myanmar, international nongovernmental organization
(INGO) representative #17, January 22, 2018). Power
plays also took place between different state bodies
(e.g., different ministries aligned with competing party
factions, as observed in Zimbabwe) and different gover-
nance levels (e.g., an Ethiopian district government offi-
cial [#2, December 5, 2017] criticizing how government
officials at regional and federal level instrumentalized
the drought for “other purposes”).
Concerning non-state actors, tensions andmisgivings
were found in every country. In all three countries, inter-
national actors were accused of being “Western agents”
with their own political agenda. The government framed
CSOs as instrumentalized by the opposition party or
the West in Zimbabwe. In Myanmar, aid organizations
were labeled as “terrorists” because they supported the
Muslim Rohingya minority, who were societally framed
as terrorists (INGO #16, January 22, 2018). This may lead
to lower acceptance of these organizations or to security
risks for their staff.
In Ethiopia and Myanmar especially, powerful inter-
national players were perceived as government-aligned
by some of their own staff members, advocacy-oriented
INGOs, and grassroots CSOs. In Zimbabwe, such criticism
was voiced by community members active in the opposi-
tion party or community governance structures.
Another similarity across the three cases was the
importance of history. Past ‘traumatic’ disaster events
associated with political instrumentalization were fre-
quently cited. In Ethiopia, the key events were the
droughts in the 1970s–1980s that led to the downfall of
regimes. In Myanmar, an important historical event was
2008 Cyclone Nargis, following which the governing mil-
itary junta initially completely blocked all international
relief. In Zimbabwe, respondents often mentioned the
2008 drought, when INGOs funded by the United States
were found to support areas controlled by the oppo-
sition party. These findings highlight how institutional
memory co-shapes state-aid-society relations asmuch as
the current (geo-)political agenda, serving to ‘legitimize’
present fears and accusations directed toward state and
non-state actors.
5.2. What Will Happen Now: Authorities’ Control
Authorities mainly influenced the disaster response
through everyday politics, including via (i) bureaucracy
and (ii) information management, and by instilling a cul-
ture of (iii) uncertainty and (iv) fear. Physical attacks and
roadblocks played only a limited role in constraining the
disaster response. The same was true of ‘bigger political
acts,’ although the declaration of a State of Emergency
in October 2016 in Ethiopia (with associated travel bans
for international actors, including diplomats), as well as
state-imposed country-wide Internet and telecommuni-
cations blackouts in Ethiopia and Zimbabwe, did occur.
5.2.1. Everyday Bureaucratic Restrictions
In all three countries, the state controlled the ‘who,’
‘when,’ ‘where,’ and ‘how’ of the disaster response
through bureaucratic mechanisms. These included the
conditions tied to the declaration of disaster emergen-
cies and disease outbreaks (without which operations
such as importing specific medicines were impossible),
the granting of visas and in-country travel authoriza-
tions, and memoranda of understanding setting activity
details. Organizational registration processes, such as the
difficult-to-obtain Private Voluntary Organization status
in Zimbabwe, also determined whether an organization
could engage in disaster response, carry out advocacy,
and/or receive international funding. These bureaucrat-
ic restrictions were felt most strongly in Ethiopia, where
an IO staff member (#8, August 4, 2017) referred to
themas the “iron cage of bureaucracy” and in Zimbabwe,
where participants mentioned “the system” by whose
rules they had to play.
Powerful non-state actors such as donors and large
INGOs were sometimes seen as reinforcing these restric-
tions. Rather than protecting CSOs against the state,
INGOs were described as emphasizing the lack of capaci-
ty among CSOs and influencing CSOs’ activities via guide-
lines and “recommendations.” In Myanmar, one CSO
(#2, November 21, 2017) had been criticized by IO repre-
sentatives for being too “negative” after the CSO, which
saw social justice promotion as integral to its mandate,
openly accused the Myanmar government of marginaliz-
ing ethnic minorities in the response.
5.2.2. Information Management
In all three countries, the state controlled information
flows and used this power to direct disaster responders
in terms of which areas to prioritize. A Zimbabwean NGO
representative (#3, November 28, 2018) argued that it
was not necessary for the authorities to push them out
of certain areas because “the figures push you out,”
meaning needs data comes out of a sketchy data col-
lection process and analysis was politically influenced.
Official documents presented disaster needs assessment
and analysis processes as technical multi-actor endeav-
ors. The Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee
results, which are released by a multi-actor network,
were nevertheless described as a series of “political find-
ings” coming out of a “political body” (former employ-
ee of a donor organization now working for an INGO, #4,
June 4, 2019). This was also the case for district hotspot
classification in Ethiopia, where the final results were
reportedly set by ruling party officials in federal govern-
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ment offices. In Myanmar, needs assessment and analy-
sis processeswere not as codified, but participants noted
the key role of the General Administration Department,
under military stewardship, which collects information
through its village tract administrator network (IO repre-
sentative, #7, January 12, 2018).
Donors also set information management standards.
Research participants noted that substantial presence
‘on the ground’ and trust-building were key in contexts
with multilayered local LIC dynamics and interference
from state actors in non-state aid processes at com-
munity level. State actors determining aid beneficiary
lists reportedly occurred quite directly in Ethiopia (e.g.,
by ward-level government officials) and indirectly in
Zimbabwe (e.g., non-state aid actors being pushed to
operate via ‘government-preferred’ community exten-
sion workers). However, direct engagement between
communities and non-state disaster responders as well
as independent data collection were constrained by
a lack of earmarked funding. INGO representatives
in Ethiopia (e.g., #44, May 25, 2017) and Zimbabwe
(#5, January 31, 2019) and the Zimbabwean former
employee of a donor organization (#4, June 4, 2019)
indicated that donors themselves considered only fig-
ures from the Ethiopian district assessment/Zimbabwe
Vulnerability Assessment Committee to be legitimate.
By further establishing the authority of information that
is largely viewed as politically distorted, donors thus pre-
vent the collection ofmore accurate information to guide
area and beneficiary selection.
5.2.3. Uncertainty
Uncertainty derived from the ambiguity and uneven
application of guidelines. In the examined cases, the dis-
aster response operations were officially managed by
civil servants, but political parties or deep state bod-
ies (e.g., the dominant party politburo in Ethiopia and
Zimbabwe and the General Administration Department
in Myanmar) influenced them behind the scenes.
The declaration of a state of disaster was deemed belat-
ed and politically motivated in Ethiopia and Zimbabwe.
In Myanmar, withholding initially promised authoriza-
tions for aid to non-Muslim communities was interpret-
ed as bureaucratically disguised politicalmanipulation by
IO (#3, November 7, 2017) and donor (#4, February 1,
2018) staff members.
Policy instruments can also propagate uncertainty.
In Ethiopia, the 70/30 regulation limited administrative
spending to a maximum of 30% without clearly defin-
ing this type of spending, thus leaving open the pos-
sibility of shutting down an organization for violating
this regulation. In Myanmar and Zimbabwe, actors could
be charged under the 2013 Telecommunications Law
and the 2002 Public Order and Security Act (amend-
ed in 2007), respectively, if their actions were judged
as threatening ‘national security’ (embassy official post-
ed in Myanmar, #1, October 6, 2017; embassy offi-
cial, #1, November 9, 2018; IO, #7, January 28, 2018,
in Zimbabwe).
5.2.4. Fear
The above restrictions and uncertainty are particularly
effective when non-state disaster responders feel mon-
itored and when there are repercussions for transgres-
sions. Concerning monitoring, formally registered non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) had to submit orga-
nizational budgets and plans to state authorities in all
three countries. In all three countries, major IOs were
also reported to have been “infiltrated” by state actors.
International aid actors faced the threat of expul-
sion from each of the examined countries. In addi-
tion, INGO and NGO directors could be held personal-
ly liable for ‘administrative faults,’ and CSO representa-
tives experienced verbal or physical intimidation for car-
rying out what they saw as their humanitarian mandate.
In Ethiopia, a CSO driver (#25, May 5, 2017) was physical-
ly struck by a government official while assisting a wom-
an who had been wounded in the protests. In Myanmar,
an INGO representative (#16, January 22, 2018) had
his identification card, including his photograph, print-
ed in a state newspaper article covering how his organi-
zation supported the “illegal and dangerous Rohingya.”
In Zimbabwe, a CSO representative (#8, November 29,
2018) was interrogated and intimidated by the Central
Intelligence Organization for distributing food aid with-
out the required organizational status.
5.3. What Will Happen Now: Actions of Non-authorities
Operating in these contexts of state control, civil society
and international disaster responders relied on different
strategies that can be categorized, from the least con-
frontational to the most confrontational: as (i) comply-
ing within the system; (ii) trying to beat the system from
within; and (iii) resisting.
5.3.1. Compliance
‘Confrontation does not work here’ was a common
mantra across the three cases. A frequently used strat-
egy was self-censorship, which was observed in words,
action, and projection of knowledge (i.e., purposive-
ly displaying ignorance regarding certain issues). Even
highly advocacy-oriented organizations remained silent.
An INGO official inMyanmar (#17, January 22, 2018) stat-
ed, “Our organization is usually a loud organization…but
here we never participate in a shout.” An exception
to this general finding was Myanmar’s peripheral Chin
State, where the central government’s grasp was weak-
er and vocal CSO representatives knew when and how
to lobby and advocate for support for their communi-
ties’ plight.
Aid actors strategically reinterpreted their mandates
and humanitarian principles. For instance, neutrality was
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reinterpreted as staying out of conflict zones altogether
(Ethiopia), and impartiality was taken to mean not privi-
leging one religious groupover the other evenwhen their
needs differed (Myanmar). In interactions with state offi-
cials in Zimbabwe, IO and CSO representatives pretend-
ed not to notice that food aid beneficiaries were selected
on the basis of party affiliation, linking the issue to target-
ing inefficiencies instead.
5.3.2. Social Navigation
Actors navigated the aforementioned challenges in four
mainways, with somenon-state actors aiming to beat the
state on its own terrain, namely that of everyday politics.
A main feature of the state system is its technicality
and overreliance on (bureaucratic) guidelines to control
humanitarian operations. In the first navigation strategy,
disaster responders tried to use this to their advantage
and displayed technical discourses and artefacts to reach
specific goals. In Ethiopia, an INGO director (#44,May 25,
2017) told government officials that his organization had
to conduct independent monitoring visits because of
donor guidelines outside his control. In Myanmar, a CSO
(#2, November 21, 2017) drafted purposefully intricate
reports full of graphs and footnotes to lobby UN officials.
In Zimbabwe, an IO official (#5, February 22, 2019) stated
that the politicization of food aid could be raised based
on solid data grounding.
Second, disaster responders were careful in address-
ing sensitive issues such as the root causes of disaster
(e.g., the Zimbabwean land reformand its impact on food
production), politicization of the disaster response (e.g.,
the Myanmar state marginalizing minorities), and even
disaster impacts (e.g., cholera epidemics in 21st centu-
ry Ethiopia boasting developmental and economic suc-
cesses such as ‘double-digit growth’). Certain issueswere
downplayed; for instance, cholera was referred to as
‘acute watery diarrhea’ in Ethiopia, and affiliations with
Western sanction-imposing donor countrieswere hidden
in Zimbabwe. In Myanmar’s Rakhine State, perception
monitoring and visibility guidelines (e.g., concerning the
fore—or backgrounding of certain activities, organiza-
tional logo or pictures on which staff members could be
identified) were crucial, both online and in the field. In all
three cases, actors highlighted their apolitical nature and
carefully screened the religion, ethnicity, or language
skills of their staff members to ensure their strategic fit
as interlocutors, from local to national level.
Third, disaster responders strategically (un-)made
actor relations. Partnering with CSOs is useful in LIC con-
texts, improving knowledge of and acceptance by com-
munities. CSOs and national staff members of interna-
tional bodies were considered skilled negotiators with
authorities. However, CSOs were also societally posi-
tioned and potentially biased themselves, leading some
international participants to dismiss a ‘localized’ disaster
response in these LIC contexts. From a CSO perspective,
bonds with powerful actors, whether they were locally
established public servants or strategically placed IO offi-
cials, were described as beneficial.Multi-mandate INGOs
andNGOs could develop broad (policy-making) networks
and fall back on these during disaster crisis moments.
The fourth navigation strategy was observed only in
Myanmar, where some CSOs and international actors
departed from the principle of impartiality in their tar-
geting by distributing aid equally to neighboring com-
munities regardless of actual need. They argued that
this approach limited tensions between Muslim and
Buddhist communities in Rakhine State and between dif-
ferent Chin ethnic groups in Chin State.
5.3.3. Resistance
In the three cases, resisting the system took five main
forms, although resistance was uncommon and rarely
openly confrontational.
One strategy was bypassing the system via parallel
routes. Of all the actors in the three case studies, only
Chin State CSOs managed to source and distribute relief
via parallel minority networks. To accomplish this, they
relied on ethnic and/or Christian ties with other CSOs
and communities (e.g., in the Myanmar ethnic state of
Kachin or the Mizoram region in India), as well as inter-
national networks.
Disaster response challenges could also be raised
directly in high-level, non-public situations, such as in
UN offices in New York (IO staff member in Ethiopia,
#9, May 30, 2017), or at field level with trusted govern-
ment officials.
Additionally, isolated statements indicated that some
actors operated ‘under the radar.’ The few examples
of this concerned organizations working without for-
mal authorization, as reported in Myanmar (INGO, #11,
January 10, 2018) and directly shared by the organization
in question in Zimbabwe (CSO, #8, November 29, 2018).
In Ethiopia, one INGO representative (#32,May 28, 2017)
confessed to sending “fake patients” to clinics to assess
the spread of an epidemic in drought areas where the
government had restricted access.
More rarely, non-state disaster responders chose to
boycott specific processes or to leave the country. Of the
41 INGO agencies represented in this study, only one
in Myanmar reported discussing these possibilities on
a weekly basis, and one had decided to leave Ethiopia.
The latter INGO (further details withheld to ensure con-
fidentiality) decided to leave the country without issu-
ing a press statement denouncing how the country con-
straints did not allow them to carry out their humanitari-
anmandate following discussion with fellow INGOs, who
feared repercussions.
Only one INGO, in Zimbabwe, openly denounced
the politicization of food aid during the 2016 drought
response. A representative from this INGO noted that
this was possible because of the organization’s estab-
lished presence in Zimbabwe and recognized status with-
in various (government) committees.
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6. Conclusions
The authoritarian LIC cases of Ethiopia, Myanmar, and
Zimbabwe differed widely; nevertheless, there were
strong similarities in the research participants’ percep-
tions of what was at stake and of how the disaster
response was shaped. This highlights the usefulness of
the small-N scenario-based approach in identifying fine-
grained disaster–conflict patterns.
These patterns were identified in exploring the ques-
tions of what is at stake and what happens now, differ-
entiating the latter for different types of actors with vary-
ing interests and power. This approach allowed us to cap-
ture the role of authorities and ‘big political acts’ revolv-
ing around the distribution of values and responsibilities,
which Olson (2000) marked as crucial. The approach also
directed our attention toward non-authorities, the inter-
play between actors, and everyday politics.
Based on fieldwork in three countries, we identi-
fied patterns in how authorities and non-authorities
strategize to advance their stakes in the response, as
presented in Table 2. In all three countries, non-state
disaster responders’ actions were hampered by clear
restrictions, but they were especially obstructed by
everyday bureaucratic acts that constrained access in
more duplicitous ways and by a culture of uncertainty
and fear. These political obstructions are closely relat-
ed to actors’ images of each other, picturing the oth-
er as ‘dangerous’ in an already unstable LIC context.
Caught in this situation, the overwhelming majority of
non-state disaster responders—even those with a tradi-
tion of open dissent—opted for a non-confrontational
approach. This resulted in a problematic homogeniza-
tion of disaster response practices, where accountability
is first toward authorities and where power imbalances
are strengthened.
Table 2.Actor strategies to advance their stake in disaster
response.
Authorities Non-authorities
Bureaucratic restrictions Compliance
Monopolizing data Social navigation
Instilling uncertainty Limited resistance
Instilling fear
Our findings speak to the disaster governance literature
in three major ways.
First, our findings highlight how social institutions,
such as power constellations, discourses, governance
arrangements, and codified practices, act as key trans-
mission belts between LIC and disaster response dynam-
ics Institutional memory of political instrumentalization
of aid, divisive LIC discourses, and a culture of distrust
translate into accusations, and strong and opaque gov-
ernment structures produce restrictive and uncertain
regulations. Heavy-handed deep state bodies also exert
influence on the humanitarian arena. Our findings thus
support the ‘disaster as lens’ approach, which sees dis-
asters as revealing rather than disrupting social process-
es and inequities (Cuny, 1983; Venugopal & Yasir, 2017).
These findings also point toward the links between the
big political framings and histories and everyday disas-
ter response acts in conflict settings. The answers to the
questions of what is at stake (rather focusing on macro-
political dynamics) and what happens now (focusing
on micro-political dynamics) are intimately interlinked.
In addition to the need to study macro-political (Olson,
2000) andmicro-political disaster dynamics (Peters et al.,
2019; Siddiqi, 2018), further research on these links
would be beneficial.
Second, the importance of framing practices for dis-
aster response cannot be overestimated. The concept of
the humanitarian arena (Hilhorst & Jansen, 2010) sets
out disaster response as the outcome of interactions.
Our study highlights the discursive aspects of these inter-
actions. In LIC scenarios, state, societal, and internation-
al disaster responders are not only occupied with the
technicalities and governance of the actual response—
from information gathering to aid distribution—but also
with the governance of how the response is perceived
in political contexts from local to international levels.
Ethical questions are raised when ‘gaining acceptance’
takes precedence over acting in accordance with human-
itarian principles.
Third, our findings should serve to remind
researchers to remain open-minded concerning the dif-
ferent actors’ roles, rather than focusing only on the
authoritarian properties of the state. Humanitarian
actors can also be powerful ‘authorities.’ Studies of
aid dynamics in authoritarian settings should thus
also detail how non-state actors co-shape the ‘rules
of the game,’ especially in the crucial area of informa-
tion management.
Although this article has focused on the workings of
governance, how this plays out in the lives of disaster-
affected people remains a pertinent question. Assisting
affected communities will obviously have secondary
(or even primary) political objectives. Powerful actors set
the rules of disaster governance, and, in authoritarian
settings, disaster responders tend to bend toward the
state. Our study has highlighted how less powerful actors
navigate the dominant power relations via everyday pol-
itics but, in most cases, end up being played by the sys-
tem rather than playing it. The strong nature of author-
itarian states may make disaster response effective and
efficient, but it can also worsen the situation for affect-
ed communities. As Olson stated (2000, p. 266), “ignor-
ing the explicit political dimension of disasters…does not
make it go away.”
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